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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
Case No. 7323 
CHIEF CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Case No. 7334 
PARK UTAH CONSOLIDATED MINES COMPANY, 
VS. 
SUMMIT COUNTY, et al, 
Case No. 7332 
SILVER KING COALITION MINING COMPANY, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Case No. 7324 
Appellant, 
Respondent. 
Appellant, 
Respondent. 
Appellant, 
Respondent. 
UNITED STATES SMELTING REFINING AND MINING COMPANY, 
Appellant, 
VS. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al, 
Case No. 7293 
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
REPLY BRIEF 
1. Judicial Notice. 
Respondent. 
Appellant, 
Respondent. 
Respondents criticize appellants for calling to the 
attention of the Court the report of a Congressional 
Committee which embodied a report to such Committee 
by the Governmental Agency charged with the respon-
sibili'ty of making the subsidy payments pursuant to 
the Act of Congress. 
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Appellants are not conscious of any impropriety in 
so doing: 
This Honorable Court will take judicial notice of 
the true signification of all English words and phrases, 
of the public and private official acts of the legislative, 
executive, and judicial departments o.f the United States, 
and of the political history of the world. In all such 
cases "the Court may resort for its aid to appropriate 
books or documents of reference.'' Section 104-46-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
''The courts may also take notice of the mis-
chief the laws were intended to remedy and of the 
public demand preceding their passage, and they 
may, with propriety, recur to the history of the 
times when the statute was passed to ascertain 
the reason as well as the meaning of particular 
provisions therein . . . ' ' 
(20 Am. Jur. Evidence, § 41) 
Thus in Outlet Embroidery Co. v. Derwent Mills, 254 
N. Y. 179, 70 A.L.R. 1440, the Court took judicial notice 
that at the time a contract for the sale of goods to be 
imported was entered into, Congress was debating a new 
tariff and 'that the debate continued for a year. 
In earlier cases involving subsidy payments this 
Honorable Court did take such notice of the actions 
taken by the government during the course of the last 
war, including the premium payment plan. (Combined 
Metals Reductions Co. v. State Tax Commission, 176 
P. 2d 614.) 
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2. An Argument Exploded. 
Respondents avoid rather than n1eet appellants' 
arglnuents by reiterating the premise of the former sub-
;::idy tax eases, stating (p. 10) : 
·' * * * Throughout the entire program, both 
before Rule 13 was a1nended and afterward, the 
premilun payments were made as a part of the 
actual total price authorized and pursuant to the 
premium price plan inaugurated jointly bT the 
Federal Loan Agency, the War Production Board 
and the Office of Price Administration. In other 
words, under O.P.A. regulations made in con-
junction with ·the 'Var Production Board the 
prices permitted to be paid for the metals were 
the ceiling prices plus the premium price. And 
the two of them together constituted the selling 
price of the ores and metals. The one was never 
divorced from the other. * * * " (Italics ours.) 
One might think it strange for counsel to persist 
in this contention on the basis of the information now 
before the court in these cases, and the facts admitted 
to be true by the demurrers below. 
And when price controls were discontinued in 1945, 
while the subsidies continued into 1947, how can respond-
ents argue ''The one was never divorced from the 
other''? Not even a shadow of basis for this argument 
continued after metal price controls went out of the 
window. 
Respondents just beg the question in baldly assert-
ing (p. 10) that "the prices permitted to be paid for 
the metals ·were the ceiling prices plus the premium 
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price. And the two of them together constituted the 
selling price of the ores and metals.'' 
3. The Basis For The Subsidies. 
Appellants have never advanced the "absurd" 
straw man that the subsidies-" so-called" by Congress 
which authorized their payment-were "outright gifts." 
(P. 5, 7) 
On the contrary, appellants contend that the sub-
sidies paid were increased in direct ratio to the need of 
each particular mine for more money than could be rea-
lized from a sale or conversion into money or its equiva-
lent of that mine's ores; they were paid, in the words of 
Congress, ''to obtain the maximum necessary produc-
tion" from the miners of this country. 
It follows that since such subsidies are the opposite 
of proceeds from the sale of ores, and no part of the 
value thereof, the payments may not be considered "in 
arriving at a proper tax base.'' 
Respondents at page 7 of their brief momentarily 
recognize this when they aptly characterize such pay-
ments by quoting from a case in which one reason for 
the allowance of bounties was given as '' produc~t~on 10'r 
manru,facture t1o be stimulated.'' 
4. Respondents' Consideration of Revised Rule 13. 
(P. 8) 
Original Rule 13 of the quota committee provided 
with respect to ores sold that premium payments would 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be ''based upon metal paid for under settlement con-
tracts·'. ( \Y e assume the court will take judicial notice 
pf the fact that in the cases where ores are sold, the 
~ales are to buyers under settlement coll'tracts, i.e., con-
tracts specifying the basis of settlement.) 
\Yith respect to ores not so sold the rule provided 
that premium payments would be based on stated per-
centages of the metal content. 
In the case of Combined ~1:etals Reduction Co. et al 
\~s. State Tax Co1nn1ission, this Honorable Court, look-
ing to the first part of the rule-that relating to ores 
sold-said it was self-evident that metals were not paid 
for under settlement contracts unless they were sold. 
Then the court added that since it appears (from the 
records in those particular cases) that the ''premium 
prices'' paid to mining companies were for metals sold 
hy them, it followed that such premium prices were in-
cludable as money received on a sale. The majority 
of the court felt that cases where ores were not so sold 
were not then before this court. 
The decision of the court was accordingly based 
squarely upon the quoted provision of Original Rule 13, 
for the court recognized that under our statute the basis 
for determining the amount of taxes due where there 
has been a sale of ore under a bon~ fide contract of 
sale is the amount of money or its equivalent actually re-
ceived from the sale. 
From the records in these cases now before the 
court involving ore sales it now appears that Original 
Rule 13 was rescinded, and a new rule adopted under 
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\\·hich subsidy payments were based on certain st'at·ed 
Jlercentages for the .respective met,als reg,ardless of the 
1w rcenta.ges actually recovered or paid for. 
Copies of the original and revised rules are attached 
as exhibits to the complaints. From these exhibits it 
appears that under the Revised Rule, even in the case of 
custom ores, payment of bounties was not "conditioned 
uE a sale'' ;-1J.1uch less were such bounties '' recei~.red on 
a sale". 
Respondents would have the court ignore the rescis-
sion of old rule 13 and the adoption of a new and differ-
ent rule. 
On page 10 of their brief respondents now recog-
nize that under Original Rule 13 a different method of 
computing premium payments was provided wherre no 
settlement oontr:acts existed. Such method is set forth 
in the instructions of Metals Reserve Company attached 
as Exhibit D to the complaint of 'the United States Smelt-
ing Refining and Mining Company in Case No. 7324, 
which exhibit, together with the copies of affidavits at-
tached, show that bonuses were paid on the basis of 
mine production records and before any sale. 
In the same complaint it is alleged 'that such bonuses 
were paid unconditionally and without any right on the 
part of the agency of the Federal Government paying 
the same to receive back the premiums paid in the event 
the metals recovered from 'the ores for the production 
of which such subsidies were paid became lost, destroyed, 
\Yere retained by the company or otherwise failed to 
enter the channels of commerce. Yet respondents ask 
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the coi.ut to believe that such bonuses were received ''on 
a sn.1e''. 
On the same pag·e respondents say there i~ noth-
ing to indicate that the purpose of 1naking premium 
pay1nents was changed by Amended Rule- 13. We agree: 
t?1e purpose of making such payments was specified by 
Congress, i.e., to obtai.n the maxi.mum necessary prodt~c­
tioJz. 
The conditions of pay1nent were, however, within 
the culHl'Ol Ol the adlllinisti:aci.ve agency. Tliat agency 
saw fit to rescind that part of Rule 13 requiring as a 
condition of pay1nent that certain ores be sold. It pre-
scribed in lieu thereof that the quanti'ties of n1etals 
prod1.tced be determined, as the basis for subsidy pay-
ments. 
u. The Kennecott and Similar Situations. 
Let us assume for this argument that Utah's statutes 
in question should be construed broadly 1agairnst the tax-
payer; and thus that the Legislature had in mind when 
it used the particular words in these statutes that pro-
ceeds or amounts realized from the sale of ores, etc., 
should include subsidies, bonuses or bounties, when tied 
into the purchase price for the s~ale of these ores. This 
apparently was the reasoning of the majority of the 
court in the Combined Metals and Haynes decisions 
based upon the records in the first series of cases sub-
mitted to this court. 
Is this court now willing to press this line of rea-
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soning to the point of creating liability in cases such 
as that of Kennecott, where no sale of the ores, on the 
increased produC'tion of which the subsidies were com-
puted and paid, eve.r took place at all? 
In such cases the first part of Rule 13 never did 
apply, either as originally promulgated and heretofore 
relied on by this court, or after revision. Further, the 
records in these cases now before the court, with the 
material facts pleaded by appellants in cooperation with 
counsel for respondents and admitted by demurrer, 
show: 
(a) The precise basis on which the subsidies were 
paid. 
(b) That this basis was not the tons of ore :sold, 
but the excess-over-quota production of ore. 
(c) When the computations for subsidy payments 
on such basis were made each month, the payments 
occurred in due course entirely apart from the subse-
quent treatment and disposition of those excess ores. 
For example are the familiar Kennecott souvenir bee-
hives, where no sale has ever taken place even of the re-
fined copper. 
This indeed is a far cry from the other type of case 
where the same smelter, buying the ores, paid to the 
seller both the sales price and on behalf of the Govern-
ment the subsidy as a premium price, both computed 
on the same ores as delivered and sold. If one is will-
ing to abrogate the familiar rule of strict construction 
in favor of the taxpayer, to assume a legislative pre-
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.3cience anticipating then unknown conditions, and to 
look to the· particular administrative restrictions and 
policies in such cases rather than the intent of Congress 
i:r;t its authorization for the payn1ent of production 
bonuses, then there is son1ething to be said for tax lia-
bility in such cases. 
But even so-a position which we respectfully sub-
mit is in error-in the entirely different situations such 
as those of the United States Smelting Company and 
Kennecott, is not the court being asked to legislate judi-
cially under any standard, and frankly to rewrite these 
tax statutes in the interests of a possible need for in-
creased revenue~ 
In their brief (p. 11) respondents do not and can-
not meet this; so they avoid the entire argument by say-
ing (1) these facts are "conclusions of law"; and (2) 
the affidavit attached to the complaint shows by the se-
lection of one word therein that the subsidy payments 
were for the sale of the ores. 
"\V e can only respectfully request the court to read 
the concise, simple amended complaint-in effect the 
entire record-in the Kennecott and similar cases, and 
then treat respondents' evasive agrument on its merit. 
It is true that the one word of the particular affidavit 
attached to the Kennecott complaint as illustrative was 
not as otherwise throughout, changed from "sold"; but 
if this court is to pin its decision on that point in view 
of the picture as otherwise pleaded and as was the fact, 
Kennecott is willing to let the matter rest on the con-
sciences of those concerned. 
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6. The Inclusion of Subsidy Paym·ents in Ueterrnining 
Net Proceeds Valuation. ('P. 13) 
Although respondents so entitle the first subdivi-
sion of their brief as to purportedly refer to the inclu-
sion of bonuses in determining the mine occupation tax, 
it will be noted that often the argument is directed 
equally to such inclusion in arriving at net proceeds. We 
have followed respondents in this, since in large part 
obviously the same rules are applicable. 
Under subdivision 2 of their brief, respondents make 
three points directed to the inclusion of premium pay-
Tnents in determining gross proceeds and thereby fixing 
the assessed value of mines. These are as follows: 
a. "Under the Utah statutes the base for deter-
mining the taxes from mines includes what is annually 
realized from the product of the mine, over and above 
the cost of expenses of obtaining such proceeds and in-
cludes the value of the ore, etc., produced but not sold 
during the year." 
This statement is obviously unwarranted in fact as 
a reference to the statute will readily disclose. Only 
when ores, produced but not sold, have been converted 
into the equivalent of· money are they to be included in 
arriving at net proceeds. 
The one case dealing with this is that of Salt Lake 
Count~T vs. Utah Copper Co., 93 Fed. 2d. 127, in which 
the question was whether "blister copper", gold and 
silver bullion produced in the preceding calendar year 
but remaining unsold, as well as the amount received 
10 
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fron1 ~ales in the preceding calendar year of ores pro-
duced, should be included in computing gross proceeds. 
It was not even contended that ores mined but not 
processed ~hould so be included. The Court held that 
such blister copper and gold and silver bullion should 
be included, saying: 
'· 'Blister copper' is copper that has passed 
through the smelting- process, metallic copper of 
a black blistered surface, or final product of con-
verting copper matte, and is about 96-99 per cent 
pure. The simple meaning of 'money' is current 
coin, but it may mean possessions expressible in 
1noney values. 'Money' has no technical meaning, 
but is of ambiguous import, and may be inter-
preted having regard to all surrounding circum-
stances under which it is used. 'Money' is often 
and popularly used as equivalent to 'property'. 
'~Ione~T' means wealth reckoned in terms of 
money; capital considered as a cash asset; speci-
fically such wealth or capital dealt in as a com-
modity to be loaned, invested, or the like; wealth 
considered as a cash asset. 'Equivalent' means 
equal in value, force, measure, power, and effect, 
or having equal or corresponding import, mean-
ing, or significance; what is virtually the same 
thing; identical in effect. * * * '' 
·'Blister copper has an established and read-
ily ascertainable market value, and when the tax-
ing authorities were apprised of the number of 
pounds produced it was a simple matter to ap-
praise its value in money.'' 
The cases cited by respondents are not in point. The 
- case of Salt Lake County vs. Utah Copper Co., 294 Fed. 
199, in which the case of Mercur Mining Co. vs. Juab 
11 
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Connt,\'· cited by respondents and other cases were re-
,·icwed and considered, held, to the contrary of respond-
ents' contention, that ''the net annual proceeds of a mine 
are the net proceeds of the sale of its product during 
the tax year ''. 
In that case it was contended by the County that the 
statutes did not contemplate that tailings must be con-
verted into cash before the proceeds tax would attach; 
and the court held against the county. Yet this is the 
authority cited by respondents. 
In the case of Tintic Standard Mining Co. vs. Uhih 
County, cited by respondents, the issue was as to the 
propriety of certain deductions from gross proceeds 
taken by the mining company and disallowed by the 
Board of Equalization. The case did not involve any 
question of the inclusion in gross proceeds of ores pro-
duced but not sold. 
b. Respondents next say that notwithstanding the 
allegations of the amended complaints here before the 
court, the cases must be considered as though the pre-
n1ium payments were made only after the ores had been 
converted into the equivalent of money. 
Respondents ignore the specific allegations as to how 
these payments were made. For instance, in the case 
of United States Smelting Refining and Mining Com-
pany, No. 7324, is to be put aside: the exhibits showing 
the instructions from Metals Reserve Company; the 
monthl:· affidavits filed by the smelting company show-
ing that the quantities of metal reported as available 
12 
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for the payment of preinituns were deterinined by mine 
production records; the allegations as to the manner 
in \Yhich the ores were treated showing the processing 
at the plant of the cmnpany at :Midvale, Utah, the ship-
ment of the resultant product for refining at other plants 
outside the State of Utah, and the date of payment of 
premiums with relation to such dates of processing and 
refining ; also the allegations that the premiums were 
paid before any sale of the ores, were paid uncondi-
tionally, and without any right on the part of the federal 
agency paying the same to recover them or any part 
thereof in the event the ores were never sold. 
Respondents ignore all this to look only to an allega-
tion quoted at page 14 of their brief in which it was 
succintly stated that monthly quotas were computed and 
·premiums were paid on a specified percentage of the 
metal contents of the qualified materials in the ores, and 
that such metal contents were determined by sampling 
and assaying before any conversion of the ores and be-
fore any processing of the ores other than such crush-
ing is as required to permit of sampling for assaying. 
This allegation respondents say is a mere ''con-
clusion of law". The allegation is one of fact as to the 
time when certain things were done; it would be as 
much a conclusion of law to say that one had breakfast 
before having lunch. 
But respondents say that the very question to be 
determined here is whether or not there was a conver-
sion of ores into money or the equivalent of money. 
That is not the ultimate question to be determined: 
13 
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the question before this court is whether or not the 
bonuses paid were any part of the gross proceeds real-
ized from the sale or conversion into money or its equival-
ent of ores produced by appellants. We submit that under 
the admitted facts pleaded in these cases now before 
the court, it cannot ~eriously be contended that the sub-
sidies were any part of such gross proceeds. 
c. Finally, respondents argue that it is immaterial 
whether the ores were converted or sold; and "When 
the ores were taken out of the mine and were sent to 
the smelter or mill, such ores immediately had a value 
in addition to their ceiling price, namely, the amount 
which was payable for such ores as premium payments". 
(p. 17) 
Here again respondents simply beg the question as 
to whether the subsidies were some part of the payment 
made for the ores; or on the contrary were, as the Emer-
gency Price Control Act of 1942 authorized, as every rule 
issued (except one rescinded portion of original Rule 
13), and as every act done evidences, bonuses paid by 
Government to ensure maximum production of certain 
strategic materials, paid because the amounts realizable 
fron1 the particular operations of a particular mine were 
not sufficient to cover costs and ensure continued maxi-
mum production. 
7. The Constitutional Question. (P. 19) 
Respondents state that they are content to rest the 
question of the constitutionality of the inclusion of 
pre1nium payments in computing the net proceeds tax 
14 
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valuation upon tlie decision of this court in "the Haynes 
case". 
It is true that in the Haynes case this Honorable 
Court did consider on the fa.cts there presented the con-
stitutionality of the inclusion of such premium payments. 
It will be remembered that in the IIaynes case this 
Honorable Court said that there either the pren1i11ms 
were receiYed only on a sale of the ores or were received 
only after the ores had been converted into the equivalent 
of money; and therefore the subsidies were properly 
treated as part of the proceeds from the mine. 
In the Haynes ease no question of subsidies other 
than premiums payable under the initial quotas estab-
lished was presented. The court did not then have, as it 
now has, the full story of the basis on which subsidies 
were paid; the determination and revision of quotas, 
the reports required from each individual mining com-
pany showing its own costs of operation and planned 
development; the elaborate calculations by the federal 
agencies required to estimate the subsidies needed to be 
made to each mining company in order to make up 
the deficits over and above the amounts receivable from 
mine operations and permit of continued operations; the 
times and conditions of payment, as for instance, retro-
active ·payments to make up for increased labor costs; 
and the reduction in quotas and consequently in subsidies 
paid when either through increased production or re-
duced costs a mine more nearly carried itself. 
Upon the records here presented, it is submitted 
15 
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that premium payments, so-called, made under the au-
thority of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 
authorizing the making of subsidy payments when neces-
sary to obtain maximum necessary production of any 
commodity, are clearly no part of the amount received 
on either a sale of ores, or on the conversion of ores 
into the equivalent of money. On the contrary, the sub-
Ridies were what had to be added to all such receipts to 
permit of continued mine operation. 
\Ve submit that the question of the constitutionality 
of the inclusion of such subsidy payments in the measure 
of value should be reviewed and considered by this Hon-
orable Court. Now that the true nature of the subsidies 
is disclosed to this court, it would well appear that they 
were no more a part of the value of each mining property 
than a $5.00 bounty for killing the animal would re-
make the coyote's $1.00 pelt into a $6.00 value. True, 
the owner-killer might realize $6.00 by collecting the 
hounty and selling the pelt to the furrier; but the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the pelt would remain the same, 
be the bounty what it may. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHENEY, MARR, \VILKINS & CANNON, 
Attorneys for Chief Consoli~at!ed Illining 
Company and United States Smelting 
Be finJing arnd M irving Com.pany 
RAY, RAWLINS, JONES & HENDERSON, 
Attorneys for Park Ut'a.h Oonsolid1ated 
Mines C om,p1any 
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R. J. HOGAN, 
Attorney for Silver Ki.ng Coalition Mines 
Company 
C. C. PARSONS, 
'V.JL 1\I. McCREA, 
~-\..D. ~:t:OFFAT, 
CAL YIN A. BEHLE, 
Attorneys for Kennecott Copper Corpora-
tion. 
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